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THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION
Arthur H. Travers, Jr.*
Jonathan M. Landers**
Although the so-called "consumer revolution" that erupted during the last
decade shows no signs of abating, there has of late been something of a shift in
emphasis. Until recently, many, if not most, consumer spokesmen stressed the
inadequacy of existing substantive standards, and the thrust of their legislative
effort was to secure laws that would make unlawful certain objectionable busi-
ness practices theretofore sanctioned by law. Thus, the 1960's saw the passage
of legislation designed to force merchants to make certain disclosures regard-
ing interest rates, to establish minimal safety standards for automobiles and
other products, to reduce the amount of confusing packaging, etc.
At present the focus seems to be less upon securing new substantive rules of
behavior and more upon the problems of securing compliance with standards
already established. Recent revelations regarding the deficiencies of the law
courts and the enforcement agencies have underlined the obvious truth that it
is not enough to pass a law prohibiting or requiring certain conduct; some
mechanism must be provided to secure compliance. While some laws may be
virtually self-enforcing, it is painfully apparent that the tendency of business-
men to obey the law simply because it is the law cannot be relied upon ex-
clusively. Presumably, it is less profitable to obey the law, otherwise no law
would be needed. Moreover, many prohibited practices are hard, if not im-
possible, to distinguish from what most businessmen would call "progressive
merchandising." Their conduct seems thus morally laudable as well as profit-
able; any qualms to the contrary are dismissed by the notion that most con-
sumers are really too shrewd to be injured and the remainder don't deserve
protection.'
But, existing sanctions also seem ineffectual to secure compliance. Ac-
cordingly, a variety of new sanctions and enforcement mechanisms are now
under consideration. Among these, the proposal to give consumers a private
right of action enforceable by a class suit in the federal courts has received the
lion's share of the attention.' It has been extravagantly praised and damned in
Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1957, Grinnell; LL.B. 1962, Harvard.
*0 Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1962, Colgate; LL.B. 1965, Harvard.
'See generally F. SuTrroN, S. HARRIS, C. KAYSEN, & J. TonIN, THE AMERICAN BUsINEss CREED 139-55
(1962).
"The Nixon Administration has introduced companion bills in the House and Senate, S. 3201, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and Senator Tydings has introduced
a different bill, S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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testimony before Congressional committees,3 and it has received considerable
attention from legal scholars. This article is intended to shed additional light
on the problem. First, it examines the ends that may be attained through the
class action that are unattainable with present remedies. Next, it looks at the
reasons underlying the push for specific federal legislation. Then, it discusses
some of the problems of qualifying for class action treatment under new rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, it looks at several of the
problems that will be presented in litigating consumer class actions.
I. THE NEED FOR A CONSUMER CLASS ACTION
Consumer fraud encompasses an infinite variety of deceptive and illegal
practices engaged in by those who directly or indirectly sell goods or render
services to persons purchasing such goods or services for personal, household,
or agricultural uses. Proponents of a consumer class action have argued that it
would give consumers a needed procedural mechanism to combat consumer
frauds. At present, however, such frauds are generally dealt with solely by
governmental activity, usually through an administrative agency, or by private
litigation. It is well, at the outset, to examine the felt deficiencies of these
techniques.
A. Governmental Action
For reasons which are well known, and can be briefly stated, victims of
consumer frauds have become increasingly disenchanted with the performance
of government agencies. For example, the Federal Trade Commission, the
chief consumer watchdog in Washington, has recently been criticized by both
"Nader's Raiders" and an American Bar Association commission for failing to
set rational priorities, for becoming bogged down in protracted, often point-
less administrative proceedings, for over-emphasizing voluntary compliance
techniques and under-utilizing formal complaint proceedings, and for failing
to police the behavior of past respondents.'
But, many of the problems plaguing the FTC are not limited to that agency.
In general, federal, state, and local agencies nominally protecting consumers
are woefully understaffed and underfinanced, morassed in a sea of red tape,
and unbearably slow acting. Many such agencies are far more responsive to
the interests of the industry they are supposed to be regulating than to the
interests of the consumers they are supposed to be protecting. In part this
results from legal requirements that agencies be staffed from the regulated
*See B.N.A., ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORT No. 448, pp. A-2, A-7 (Feb. 10, 1970).
'E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969),
revised and published in a trade edition as, THE "NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1969); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); Hearings
on S. 860 and S. 2045, Before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Committee on
Government Operations, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81-121, 365-98 (1969).
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industries ;5 in part it stems from continuous contacts with the industry
and virtual isolation from consumers. Apart from the problems posed by in-
efficient or unenthusiastic enforcement, many of the federal and state agencies
charged with protecting the consumer against fraudulent or deceptive practices
are limited to seeking injunctive relief or cease and desist orders, or in practice
seek such prospective forms of relief (including the even weaker assurance of
voluntary compliance) in the overwhelming majority of cases initiated. This
means that the injured consumer who does complain cannot obtain restitution
through agency action. Moreover, a merchant has little to lose by engaging
in consumer frauds while. prolonging the litigation since those profits earned
before he comes to the agency's attention, and while the proceedings are pend-
ing, are his forever.6
B. Private Individual Litigation
On the other hand, private litigation is often not a viable alternative.
Whether the consumer fraud is to be asserted affirmatively to gain a monetary
recovery, or defensively, to resist payment of an otherwise legal obligation, the
relatively small amount of the consumer's loss makes it virtually impossible
for him to induce an attorney to litigate the issue.' Moreover, even if the con-
sumer could secure an attorney, the costs of the action-including attorney's
fees, unrecovered litigation expenses, as well as the loss of working time in at-
tending interviews, pre-trial activities, and trial itself-are sufficiently high to
deter even the most fervent suitor. Although some of the out-of-pocket costs
can be avoided if the consumer acts as his own counsel, doing so will certainly
increase the time commitment he must make to the litigation. At the same
time, because he is untrained in legal niceties, and because he is emotionally
involved in the case, the consumer is likely to give himself poor representation.
In some cases, a consumer may qualify for the assistance of a Legal Aid
office. However, some offices have maximum income limits that effectively
exclude many consumers. Even if the consumer can qualify, Legal Aid offices
are often so inundated with work and so understaffed that they must attempt
to resolve the case with a minimum amount of effort.' In practice, this often
means attempting to negotiate a settlement of the client's grievance. Many
merchants are only too glad to make such adjustments since only a small per-
'For example, the Kansas Truth in Lending Act-a major piece of consumer legislation-is enforced
by officials who are required by statute to have a close connection with the industries being regulated.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16 -40 3(a), 16-805, 16-808(a), (c), (e), 17-2232-33, 74-3104, 75-1304 (1964 and
Supp. 1969).
See, e.g., Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Prob-
lems, 48 B.U.L. REV. 559 (1968); Tydings, Fair Play For Consumers, TRIAL, February-March at 37
(1970); Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Eflective Programs for Protection, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 395, 424-27, 442-45 (1966).
Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Eflective Programs for Protection, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 395, 403 nn.52-53, 409 n.100 (1966).
'Professor Paul G. Garrity, Deputy Director of the National Consumer Law Center, has estimated that
during fiscal year 1968 alone Legal Services Attorneys handled approximately 475,000 legal matters, of
which 18 per cent, or 85,000, were consumer problems. See Senate Hearings on S. 1980: The Consumer
Class Action Jurisdiction Act, a summary of testimony prepared by the National Consumer Law Center.
115 CONG. REC. [Senate] 11411, 11412 Sept. 26, 1969.
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centage of consumers complain. Obviously, such individualized restitution is as
ineffective as a cease and desist order in deterring illegal practices.' If the
merchant refuses to settle, the Legal Aid office may not be willing to engage in
litigation because it results in an undue commitment of limited resources, or it
may be confronted with a reluctant plaintiff who is unwilling or unable to
devote the necessary time to the litigation.
C. Objectives of the Class Action
To many consumer advocates, the class action device seems an ideal solu-
tion to the gaps left by the existing set of remedies. First, it can provide resti-
tution to all victims of consumer frauds simply by virtue of their status as class
members. In this respect, the class action is particularly appealing because it
enables the representative to press the claims of those consumers who are un-
willing or unable to participate in litigation. To be sure, the class action is
often praised as enabling consumers with small claims to aggregate them into
a claim large enough to make litigation economically feasible.'" While it
can be argued that liberal permissive joinder rules allow all consumers in-
terested in litigation to sue as a group without the necessity of resorting to a
class action," implicit in the argument for the class action is the idea that the
number of defrauded consumers will be too large for convenient joinder
and that many of that number will be interested in the litigation only if
some representative sues for them. In summary, the class action seems to ensure
restitution to defrauded consumers without any action on their part.
Second, the class action is thought to act as an effective deterrent to deceptive
practices, where existing administrative and legal processes have failed, since
the merchant will apprehend high damage awards, heavy litigation expenses,
and extensive unfavorable publicity. 2 If deceptive practices generate the most
profit for the merchant, as discussed above, governmental action which allows
the merchant to retain all or most of his profits (perhaps with the deduction
of minimal penalties) will not materially alter his business behavior. But a
weapon that forces the merchant to disgorge all the profits of his deceptive
conduct, and imposes additional costs as well, may make it less profitable for
the merchant to persist in consumer frauds than it would be for him to shift
to unobjectionable techniques.
While the class action promises several decided advantages for the con-
sumer, the injunction is not a prudent remedy to seek through this procedure
for several reasons. In most instances, the foregoing objectives of the consumer
'See Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 115, 116-
18 (1969); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 805, 814-15 (1967); Interview with Arthur Benson, Staff Attorney with the Legal Aid and
Defender Society of Greater Kansas City in Kansas City, Missouri, February 9, 1970.
" See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Practices Act, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1101,
1102-03; Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REV. 407,
408, 417-19 (1969); Tydings, supra note 6.
USee Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 438-
39 (1960).
12 See, e.g., Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 80, 81 (1969); Tydings, supra note 6.
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class action can only be realized if tie action seeks monetary damages and is
not limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. The restitutional objective can-
not by definition be furthered by injunctive or declaratory relief, and since it is
prospective in nature, does not help those already defrauded. Nor is the deter-
rent objective furthered by injunctive or declaratory relief, which allows the
merchant to retain his profits, including those garnered while litigating the
injunction action.
The injunction, then, does not advance either of the aims sought by con-
sumers in the class action. In addition, there are potential difficulties in con-
sumer class actions for injunctive relief. First, since the prospect of substantial
attorney's fees in injunctive actions is ephemeral, those private attorneys
nominally representing consumer clients but actually engaging in the litigation
for the substantial counsel fees which a victory will generate will not be
willing to prosecute such litigation. While it may be possible to rely to some
extent on the ever burgeoning number of poverty agencies for such actions,"8
experience in the securities and antitrust fields has shown that the private at-
torney (who will be compensated from the recovery in a successful class ac-
tion) can be a forceful advocate on behalf of the consumer and can be instru-
mental in protecting against consumer frauds. 4 Moreover, the availability of
poverty agencies would not seem to make an injunctive remedy in a consumer
class action any more feasible since they cannot help those victimized by con-
sumer frauds preying on middle or upper class consumers, nor can reliance be
placed on poverty agencies where no such agencies exist. Also, experience has
shown that existing agencies are often too busy handling matrimonial prob-
lems, evictions, garnishments, welfare abuses and the like to devote the time,
effort, and manpower necessary for successfully prosecuting the consumer class
action.
While it is not our purpose to examine the availability and scope of avail-
able injunctive relief, there are certain generic problems which curtail the
utility of such relief. Thus, the right to injunctive relief may be unavailable if
the merchant has stopped his unlawful practice, or if an arguably unlawful
practice is currently under investigation by a governmental authority which
has the power to issue injunctions where necessary "in the public interest." The
merchant may have used a variety of practices, thus raising questions about the
scope of injunctive relief. Furthermore, an injunction is not self-enforcing, but
requires the consumer and his attorney to make an additional trip to court by
the consumer to enforce the court's order. Enforcing the injunction may result
in a Pyrrhic victory for the consumer who finds the violation of the injunc-
'See Dole, supra note 10, at 1111-12.
"See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035
(1967); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484,
486, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. C4t-. L. REv. 684, 715-17 (1941). Mrs. Virginia Knauer, President Nixon's Special Assistant for
Consumer Affairs has testified that the private bar is a "sleeping giant" that could do more for the
consumer than a government agency. See Senate Hearings on S. 1980, 115 CONG. REC. 11411, 11412




tion excused as being unintentional or insubstantial or that the court excused
the defendant with a small fine and a promise to behave in the future. 5
Finally, a major justification for the consumer class action has been the
failure of federal and state agencies, armed only with the injunctive power, to
protect consumers. In this connection, it has forcefully been urged that only
the fear of substantial damage awards-such as those which might be recovered
in a class action-will deter consumer frauds. 6 Consumers deserve stronger
weaponry than that which has already failed. Indeed, the Holland Furnace
case, cited by proponents as demonstrating the need for the consumer class ac-
tion, is a clear example of the inadequacy of the injunctive remedy.' 7
D. Present Availability of Class Actions
At this point, it may be asked why, if the class action is so powerful, has it
not already been utilized in cases involving consumer fraud? The class action
is allowed in virtually all state courts and in the federal courts."8 What is
wrong with present class action rules? Why should special legislation be re-
quired? If some legislative adjustment in class actions is needed, should it be
state or federal ?
1. Federal Courts. Consumer class actions may be brought in the federal
courts only if jurisdictional requirements are met. 9 There is rarely federal
question jurisdiction since most actions to remedy consumer frauds have their
genesis in state law. Likewise, complete diversity of citizenship between the
representatives of a class and the defendants is sometimes difficult to obtain.
Moreover, any case founded upon diversity or the general federal question pro-
vision must meet the jurisdictional requirement that the amount in controversy
exceed $10,000. Prior to the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules- of Civil
Procedure, it was relatively clear that individual claims of a so-called "spurious"
35See generally Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 1: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L.
R'Ev. 211 (1969), for a discussion of the administrative problems involved with the consumer injunction
action.
" Cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485-87, (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics:
The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REV. 658, 663 (1956); See authorities cited in
note 6, supra.
17 See Tydings, supra note 6. The Holland Furnace Company engaged in the widespread practice of
inducing consumers to contract for furnace repairs by representing their salesmen as building inspectors
and other public officers, or heating engineers, by representing that furnaces were defective and likely to
cause death or serious injury, by representing that dismantled furnaces could not be reassembled, etc.
In 1936, the company agreed to a consent order (24 F.T.C. 1413-14 (1936)), and even though com-
plaints continued, the FTC did not initiate new proceedings until 1954 which resulted in a cease and
desist order in 1958 (55 F.T.C. 55 (1958)). This order was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in 1959 and made permanent by that court's 1961 affirmance. Holland Furnace Co. v.
F.T.C., 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961). Holland continued to violate the order until 1965, when the
Seventh Circuit found the company and a number of its officers in contempt of court and imposed a
$100,000 fine for the company, a short prison term for the president, and minor penalties for other
company officials. In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924
(1965). It thus took six years (1959-65) to get enforcement of the FTC injunction. It is difficult to see
why an injunction obtained in a consumer class action would have been any more effective than that
obtained by the FTC. The $100,000 fine imposed is probably substantially less than the profits Holland
garnered in the six-year period by disobeying the injunction.
.See generally Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L.
REv. 407 (1969).
"28 U.S.C.A. SS 1331, 1332 (1966).
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class action could not be aggregated."0 Although it was argued that the 1966
amendments attempted to obliterate the old categories, the Supreme Court, in
Snyder v. Harris,2 smuggled them into the new rule by determining that
claims could not be aggregated to make the jurisdictional amount in class ac-
tions that would have been classed as "spurious" under the old rules. Since
virtually all consumer class actions for damages would have been classified as
"spurious" under the old rule, the federal courts are closed unless one-and
possibly al1 22-members of the class have individual claims in excess of $10,000.
Because the basic impetus for a consumer class action stems from the fact that
individual consumer claims almost invariably fall far short of this figure, the
federal courts are, in practice, unavailable.
2. State Courts. State rules regarding class actions fit one of four patterns-
common-law, the Field Code provisions, the pre-1966 version of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("old rule 23"), and the present version of
Federal Rule 23 ("new rule 23"). Both the common law and Field Code
requirements are elastic, authorizing a class action when there are common
questions of law or fact, and the class members are too numerous to permit
joinder.2" The two versions of the Federal Rules contain these two require-
ments together with others addressed to the assurance of proper class repre-
sentation, protection of absent class members, manageability, and compromise.
Certain preliminary observations can be made that are applicable to each of
the four patterns of regulating class actions. First, there is nothing in existing
restrictions which would effectively bar a court from allowing a consumer class
action. For example, a court could easily find that a consumer class action
satisfies the typical Field Code provision24 authorizing class actions when the
question is one of "common interest" or where parties are too numerous to be
joined. In this respect it is significant that a handful of recent state court de-
cisions in states that have large urban populations and are often thought of as
being in the forefront of legal reform show what may prove to be a trend to-
ward allowing the consumer class action regardless of type of governing pro-
vision. Thus far, consumer class actions have been approved in California
(Field Code);25 Illinois (common-law);2 and Michigan (old rule 23).27 It is
'See 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACricE 23.13, at 23-2953 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mooa].
u394 U.S. 332 (1969).
'C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 316 n.86 (2d ed. 1970).
'N.Y. Civ. Prac. S 1005; Cal. Civ. Pro. S 382; Starrs, supra note 10, at 427.
'Section 1005(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides: "Where the question is
one of a common or general interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties
are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue
or defend for the benefit of all."
"Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967); Sterling Finance
Corp. v. Springston, 2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 9631 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969).
'Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 9652 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co.
1969); Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 I1. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
' Gervais v. Annapolis Homes, Inc., 377 Mich. 674, 142 N.W.2d 7 (1966); cf. Theisen v. City of
Dearborn, 5 Mich. App. 607, 147 N.W.2d 720 (1967). But see Freeman v. State-Wide Carpet Distribs.,
Inc., 365 Mich. 313, 112 N.W.2d 439 (1961), in which the court refused to permit plaintiffs to join
similar claims against a carpet company. This decision-which has not been cited since-appears to have
been overruled sub silentio by the later Michigan :ases such as Gervais v. Annapolis Homes, Inc. See
Starrs, supra note 10, at 479-80.
1970]
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instructive to note that the rationale of the California court in Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co.-that the failure to allow such actions would effectively preclude relief
and would permit a wrongdoer to keep his ill-gotten gains2 -does not depend
upon the language of the California code provision and is applicable to con-
sumer class actions regardless of the state provision under which they are
brought.
Despite the fact that a substantial number of states have followed the fed-
eral lead and enacted new rule 23, there is a dearth of authority involving con-
sumer class actions in those states. Nonetheless, there is strong support for the
proposition that new rule 23 is not designed to restrict significantly the avail-
ability of the class action, and that its detail and complexity are intended to
provide courts with a more useful set of guidelines and techniques for regulat-
ing the class action."9 Moreover, the federal courts have expressed a willing-
ness, and even an eagerness, to entertain class actions for securities and antitrust
claims under new rule 23, and there is no reason to expect different treatment
of consumer fraud actions in states which have adopted the new rule.30
Yet if it is true that nothing in the rules forbids a court to entertain a con-
sumer class action, it is equally true that nothing compels a court to do so. A
litigant or attorney contemplating such an action will have to make a judg-
ment as to the probability of the action being sustained based on what other
materials are available. Unfortunately, the authority upon which to base such
a decision is rather sparse. In most states a large proportion of the class action
precedents are antiquated and factually distinguishable. Also, many of them
were decided under procedural rules no longer in effect. To the extent that
these precedents do indicate how a court would handle a consumer class action
today, a disappointingly large share of them offer highly restrictive interpreta-
tions of the class action rule in question."'
It may be that the courts in states with no close, current precedent would
look to cases recently decided in other states, and the already numerous federal
decisions in analogous fields. It is also possible that states with governing pro-
visions other than new rule 23 will interpret their provisions as congruent with
new rule 23 and its apparent receptiveness to the consumer action."2
While, as noted, the trend is promising, there is one dark spot. New York
has held that where the relief sought is damages rather than injunctive or
' 67 Cal. 2d at ..... 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738. See Contract Buyers League v. F. & F.
Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7, 12-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'See, e.g., Advisory Committee's Note to MINN. STAT. ANN. Rule 23 at 413 (West 1968); Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1), 81 HARV. L. Rxv. 356, 394-98 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]; NoTEs OF THE ADvSORY CoM-
MITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES, 39 F.R.D. 73, 98 (1966).
'See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d
94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied .... U.S .... (1969); Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1968).
' See generally Starrs, supra note 10, for a review of the governing state provisions and their applica-
tion to the consumer class action.
"2 In Daar, the California court pointed to a "substantial coincidence" between its code provisions and
new rule 23. 67 Cal. 2d at ... , 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
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declaratory relief the class action is improper in consumer and like cases 8'
In view of the earlier conclusion that only the action for damages will achieve
the objectives of the consumerists, this limitation is severe. Obviously, courts of
uncommitted states are as free to follow New York as they are to follow other
states permitting the damage action.
In sum, then, the situation in the state courts is beclouded by considerable
uncertainty. While some private attorneys or legal aid offices may be willing
to take a chance with a consumer class action if the potential recovery is large
enough to make the risk worth taking, development of the consumer class
action into a formidable weapon would be materially hastened by a legislative
enactment that at least accorded a prima facie validity to consumer class actions.
E. Elements of a Federal Solution
While it is true that the passage of appropriate legislation by state legisla-
tures could solve many of the problems discussed above, a brief look should be
taken at possible federal correctives. A minimal federal effort would be the
overruling of Snyder v. Harris, either for consumers alone or for all class
action litigants. This would open the federal courts for cases meeting the diver-
sity or federal question requirements, and, while it would leave most consumer
actions for state court adjudication, it would permit the development of some
federal consumer class action precedents to provide guidance for state courts.
But, while overturning the Snyder doctrine seems a necessary element in any
important federal statute, it would clearly not be sufficient to make the class
action an effective consumer weapon, since the uncertainty of state law would
continue to deter many such actions. Possibly for this reason, two bills presently
before Congress call for more significant federal involvement.
Only slightly more impressive would be federal legislation providing a
federal forum for class actions to enforce state-created consumer rights until
such time as the states themselves pass consumer class action bills substantially
equivalent to the federal bill. Under this theory, substantive state law is ade-
quate to protect the consumer, and state courts are deemed the preferable
forum, but there would be a federal interest in making sure that the consumer
had available at least one forum in which he could confidently predict that the
availability of a class action would make effective enforcement of his rights
possible. Federal jurisdiction would be founded upon the power to regulate
' Hall v. Coburn Corp., N.Y.LJ., August 8, 1968, p. 2, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), al'd mem., 31 App. Div. 2d
892, 298 N.Y.S.2d 894, afl'd mer .. .... N.Y.2d ......... N.E.2d ......... N.Y.S.2d .... (1969) (class action not
permitted for forfeiture of credit charges due to finance company utilizing contracts printed in small
type); Onofrio v. Playboy Club, 20 App. Div. 2d 3, 244 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1963) (dissenting opinion),
afl'd on dissenting opinion, 15 N.Y.2d 740, 205 N.E.2d 308, 257 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1965) (class action not
permitted for recovery of membership dues improperly applied); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287 (1938) (class action permitted to enjoin special charge by utility). But cf.
Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 88 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1966) permitting class
action on behalf of limited partners in real estate syndicate to recover investment losses by lease agreement
agreed to by defendants. Any thought that the Lichtyger decision heralded a new receptivity to the con-
sumer class action in New York appears to have been squelched by the Court of Appeals' affirmance of
the lower courts in Hall v. Coburn Corp.394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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activity affecting interstate commerce; in effect, there would be federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to enforce consumer rights created by any state that had not
been certified by the appropriate federal official as substantially equivalent in
its class action provisions."
Even this would be less than the consumerists desire, however. Consumerists
want more than the guaranteed right to bring a class action in some court; they
want to be able to bring such actions in the federal courts. While it is possible
to articulate the reasons for this preference in several ways, in the final analysis,
they boil down to one thing: Consumers, and those who will represent them,
believe that they will get a better brand of justice in the federal courts. It
would, we think, be pointless to attempt to articulate some "federal interest" in
providing that better brand of justice to consumers that would be distinctive
and inapplicable to other groups who also feel that the federal courts are more
responsive to their needs than the state courts. Suffice it to say that as long as
Congress limits its efforts to consumer problems affecting interstate commerce,
there will be no significant constitutional obstacle to providing federal question
jurisdiction to handle consumer class suits."6 So long as a measure is constitu-
tional, the existence of a "federal interest" may adequately be evidenced by the
enactment itself.
In order for Congress to make federal courts generally available to con-
sumers, it must create a federal private right of action in consumers victimized
by deceptive or fraudulent practices. The only question remaining is what
body of substantive law shall be used to determine which practices can form
the basis for such a private action. On the one hand, Congress could use exist-
ing federal law or build into the statute a general definition or enumeration of
the practices giving rise to a federal consumer action. Or, Congress might in-
corporate the standards presently applicable in the several states to define an
actionable practice. Obviously, combinations of these approaches are also
possible. In any case, Snyder v. Harris must be overcome by allowing aggrega-
tion of individual claims to make the $10,000 limitation or by dispensing with
the jurisdictional amount entirely in such cases.
II. CoNSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNDER NEW RULE 23
A. General Observations
In assessing the relation of any newly authorized consumer class actions to
existing class action rules, it seems best to use new rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as a model. Although, as already noted, consumer class
actions are difficult to bring in federal courts, consumerists have directed their
major efforts to securing consumer class action legislation at the federal level,
1' This official could be the Attorney General, the head of the proposed consumer protection division
of the Department of Justice if the division is ever created, or the person holding the present office of
consumer counsel if the office is ever filled.
"Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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and both bills presently before Congress build upon rule 23. Moreover, several
states have already adopted the 1966 amendments to the federal rules, and, if
past experience is any guide, most others who already have procedural codes
based on the federal rules will do so shortly."7 Finally, the vast majority of class
action precedents are federal and there is a tendency for state courts interpret-
ing class action provisions different from rule 23 to look to federal precedents.
In order for a consumer right to be maintained as a class action, it must
meet the general criteria established in rule 23(a) and fall within one of the
three categories listed in 23(b).
B. Rule 23(a)
The consumer plaintiffs must meet the requirements that there be a de-
finable class of plaintiffs, that the class be too numerous to permit joinder, that
there be common questions of law or fact, and that the representatives will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."8
1. The "Class" Dimension.-Ordinarily, defining the class of consumer
plaintiffs should not be difficult. The class may be comprised of persons affected
by a representation or series of representations made by a defendant or group
of defendants, it may consist of persons who purchased a certain product or
service within a specified period of time, or it may consist of persons who bear
a certain relationship to the defendant.3 9
The problem of class definition should be distinguished from problems of
identifying class members and managing overly-broad classes. Whether it will
be possible and economically feasible to identify class members at some stage
of the litigation, either at the time of initial notice or if and when the represen-
tatives are successful, bears on the difficulty of managing the action but not on
whether an appropriate class exists." Accordingly, a class defined so broadly
as to be unwieldy may have to be redefined and limited to meet the manage-
ment problems that have arisen.4
The small size of individual consumer claims, and the relatively large num-
bers of class members necessary to make the action feasible will ordinarily war-
rant a determination that the class is, as required by rule 23(a) (1), too numer-
ous to permit joinder.
2. The "Representational" Dimension.-If there is an appropriate class, the
representative must establish that his claims are "typical" and that he can fairly
and adequately represent the class as a whole. Although it is set forth as an
' Kansas, for example, adopted the 1966 amendments to the federal rules in 1969. KAN. STAT. ANN.
S 60-223 (Supp. 1969).
'Because of the conclusion that the consumer class action will be governed by rule 23(b)(3), which
requires that common questions of law or fact predominate, the common questions issue will be postponed
for the discussion of the 23 (b) (3) requirements.
'See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (purchasers of securities during specified
period); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (persons relying
on false representations); Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 9652 (I11.
Cit. Ct. Cook Co. 1969) (all charge account customers of store).
'See Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 724,
433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
"See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461-62 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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independent requirement, the need for typicality is considered only one aspect
of guaranteeing that the representative be qualified to give fair and adequate
representation to the class. 2 Therefore, differences between the representative's
claims which are insufficient to warrant a finding that there is no class-such as
difference on the issue of reliance or amount of damages-will not support a
finding that his claim lacks typicality.
In judging whether the plaintiff could fairly and adequately represent the
class, early cases tended to put a heavy burden on the plaintiff to establish his
qualifications, and the courts were especially wary of actions in which the
plaintiff's claim was a relatively small amount of the total amount sought. 8
Since the persistence of this approach would have created a difficult hurdle in
the case of consumer class actions, it is fortunate that more recent authority
indicates that the plaintiff's qualification will depend upon whether he has a
conflict of interest with some or all of the class members, whether the action
is collusive, and whether his attorney is competent to prosecute the action-in
other words, "whether plaintiff will put up a real fight."44 This seems a sound
shift in emphasis toward the realities of litigation, especially the reality that it is
often the plaintiff's attorney who is the moving force behind the litigation. It
also seems warranted since the defendant's challenge may frequently be a
litigation tactic unrelated to the representative's ability, and placing inordinate
or unrealistic burdens upon the plaintiff-respresentative seems inconsistent with
the present effort to make the class suit a useful device for processing small
claims. Obviously, if another member of the class intervenes and raises the
issue, a stiffer burden would be appropriate. 5 In such a case, however, the
intervening class member would ordinarily be available as a more suitable
substitute.
C. Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b) (2) allows a class action where "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole."
Certainly, it is true that the behavior of a merchant engaged in a single decep-
tive practice or single group of deceptive practices can be fairly described with
the language of 23(b) (2). But, this section applies only to those types of ac-
tions in which declaratory or injunctive relief is peculiarly appropiate.4" As
noted above, the consumer's problem is not of this sort and rule 23(b)(2)
would thus seem of limited utility. Not only can such an action be handled
through a damage remedy, but the major impetus behind the consumer class
action is based on the idea that only damage actions can effectively restore
what the consumer has lost and deter further commission of consumer frauds.
" 3B MOORE 23.06-2.
"Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968); Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
" Z. CHAFER, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 231 (1950); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,
562-63 (2d Cir. 1968); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7, 10 (N.D. I11. 1969);
Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d at 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
"Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102; Kaplan, supra note 29, at p. 389.
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However, in some situations a class action under rule 23(b) (2) may be of
some use to the consumer. To be sure, in a seemingly insignificant percentage
of cases an injunctive remedy may achieve much the same thing as a damage
remedy. Suppose a large number of consumers are induced to participate in a
freezer plan by fraudulent representations about the quality of the freezer and
the cost savings to be expected through purchase of food through the plan.
If a class suit can be brought before class members have paid more than the
freezer is worth, it may be possible to protect them completely by enjoining
the collection of any additional payments under the plan. Plaintiffs would thus
get the freezers for no more than their fair market value. Nonetheless, it does
appear that very few consumer frauds will lend themselves to this approach.
Moreover, as it will appear that (b) (3) is the appropriate vehicle for consumer
class actions for affirmative monetary relief, there is no a priori reason to sup-
pose that courts will allow consumers to circumvent specialized criteria or addi-
tional protection through artful pleading which disguises the suit as a (b) (2)
action.
D. Rule 23(b)(1)
Class actions are maintainable under 23(b)(1) wherever actions by or
against individuals would create one of two risks: (1) the risk to the party op-
posing the class (usually the defendant) that differing judgments in individual
actions would "establish incompatible standards of conduct," or (2) the risk
that an adjudication involving members of the class would "as a practical
matter" be dispositive of the rights of non-party class members (usually plain-
tiffs) or "substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests."
For a variety of reasons, 23(b) (1) seems inapplicable to consumer class ac-
tions. First, (b) (1) actions seem to contemplate that there be an actual, as
opposed to a merely theoretical, risk that a multiplicity of individual actions is
likely.4" If the proponents of consumer class actions are correct in their con-
tentions that in the absence of a class action mechanism, individual actions will
not be brought, any risk of inconsistent adjudications to the defendant seems
insignificant.
Subsection (b) (1) (A) seems inapplicable to consumer class actions because
it was addressed to the case where a defendant was required by law, or by
necessity to treat all class members alike,4" for example a public utility, or an
upper riparian owner. However, there being nothing which requires a mer-
chant or manufacturer to treat all consumers alike, (b) (1) (A) is not applicable.
A better case can be made for allowing consumer class actions under sub-
section (b)(1)(B), but it is not, in our judgment, persuasive. In effect, the
argument is that the action may be brought under this subsection because any
decision rendered in a suit brought by one of a class of consumers will, as a
practical matter, either dispose of, or substantially affect, any subsequent action
' See generally 3B MOORE 23.35[ 1 ].
' See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 100.
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brought by another member of the class simply because the first decision will
be a precedent in subsequent cases. This argument, however, claims too much.
For any case to qualify for class action treatment under 23(a) (2) there must be
common questions of law or fact, and under 23(b)(3) these questions must
"predominate." Hence, in any case meeting these criteria the first decision will
be a precedent. In effect the argument from stare decisis converts virtually all
class actions into (b) (1) (B) actions, rendering the other alternatives under
rule 23(b) superfluous.
Moreover, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin4" the Second Circuit held that
claims of odd-lot purchasers of securities against odd-lot dealers did not fall
within (b) (1) and it seems that this result should apply equally when the pur-
chasers are consumers and the dealers are retailers or manufacturers. By the
same token, the numerous class actions based on securities frauds have con-
sistently been held to be (b) (3) rather than (b) (1) (B) actions,"° and it is hard
to perceive any difference between a securities fraud and a consumer fraud.
Finally, the Advisory Committee, in its comments, seems to place consumer
actions in (b) (3). All of the examples given of (b) (1) (B) actions seem
factually distinguishable from consumer class actions for fraud, whereas fraud
cases are listed with antitrust cases as actions that typically will be brought
under (b) (3)." While it is possible to conjure up special cases in which
(b) (1) (B) might be satisfied, these seem of little practical significance.
E. Rule 23(b)(3)
Since the overwhelming majority of consumer class actions will have to be
brought under rule 23(b) (3), this means that certain specialized criteria set
forth in that rule must be met. The court must determine not only that com-
mon questions of law or fact exist but that they "predominate" over the in-
dividual questions. In addition, the class action must be superior to other avail-
able methods for a fair resolution of the controversy. Both standards contem-
plate the exercise of broad judicial discretion.
1. Predominance of Common Question of Law or Fact. A finding that
common questions of law or fact predominate does not mean that no individ-
ual differences among the claims of class members are permissible. In the
analogous area of class actions for securities frauds, it has been held that the
common questions predominate notwithstanding individual questions of re-
liance and damages and the fact that class members were affected by different
"'391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
$'See, .g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969);
Bragalini v. Biblowitz, 13 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 23(b)(3), Case 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also, Contract
Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7, 14 (N.D. I1. 1969).
' Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 100-03. The following were given as examples of
23(b)(1)(B) actions by the Committee: actions by policyholders attacking a reorganization of a fraternal
benefit society, actions by shareholders to require the declaration of a dividend or to enforce preemptive
rights, actions against a fiduciary which require an accounting to restore the subject of the trust, actions
by creditors against a fund which is inadequate to satisfy the claims of all creditors, actions by creditors
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, and various injunctive actions.
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representations during a given period of time.52 Most actions based on a con-
sumer fraud will doubtless exhibit at least that much commonality. It seems
clear that consumer reliance on a group of false advertisements, or the com-
mon practice of a chain store to misweigh its meat, will qualify for class action
treatment. Moreover, if experience in the securities and antitrust fields is a
guide, close questions will be called in favor of the class action, with the con-
tinuing ability of the court to dismiss the action, redefine the class, or take
other action if developments make it appear that the initial decision was
unwise.5"
However, there are certain recurrent types of consumer frauds which will
probably not satisfy the requirements of 23(b) (3), such as the generally dis-
honest merchant who uses a wide range of deceptive methods, varying them
from individual to individual. For example, the merchant may misrepresent
the quality of the goods to one buyer, the age of the goods to a second, the
applicable warranty to a third, and the credit terms to a fourth. Aside from the
fact that the defendant is the same in all four cases, there is no "common
question" which would allow for class action treatment. Thus, the manufac-
turer with poor quality control, or the vacuum cleaner company which em-
ploys a number of salesmen, each with his distinctive "pitch," is not susceptible
to class action treatment under (b) (3) because of the absence of sufficient com-
mon questions.
2. Superiority of the Class Action. In actions to remedy securities frauds,
courts have consistently held the class action superior to other methods of ad-
judicating the controversy based on the small size of individual claims and
the practical inability of the victims of security frauds to utilize any other
methods of redress.54 The victims of consumer frauds are likewise in a poor
position to seek legal redress both because they have insufficient information
to prosecute individual actions and because individual redress is prohibitively
expensive.5" Applying the factors enumerated in 23(b) (3) as pertinent, there is
little individual interest in controlling the prosecution of separate actions, and
there is likely to be little or no litigation already pending in the forum. More-
over, with consumers as plaintiffs, the forum will normally be proximate to the
area affected by the consumer fraud. Since the wrong has had its effect in this
area the desirability of having the action concentrated in such forum goes with-
out question.
"Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Berland v.
Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 126-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Professor Kaplan, who served as reporter to the
Advisory Committee, has written that the "Committee forecast that cases of fraudulent misrepresentations
or antitrust violations affecting numerous persom would be likely, although not by any means sure
candidates for class treatment under subdivision (b) (3)." Kaplan, supra note 29, at 393.
'See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 407 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Hohmann v. Packard Instruments Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968);
Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7, 14 (N.D. I11. 1969).
"See the cases cited in notes 52 and 53, supra.
'See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 1.4, at 686.
1970]
KANSAS LAW REvIEw
This leaves only the factor of the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
"management" of the litigation. In our judgment, this factor calls for separate
treatment. An action may be sufficiently difficult to manage even as a class
suit so that it is not feasible to deal with the consumer fraud involved and yet
not be so difficult as to fail to qualify for class action treatment under Rule
23(b) (3). Indeed, aside from the few cases that will fail to qualify because of
inordinate difficulty in management or the absence of sufficient common ques-
tions, the real problem regarding class actions seems to be whether they are
feasible as a practical matter.
III. MANAGING THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION
There are three separate, but interrelated, variables involved in analyzing
problems to be encountered in managing the consumer class action. First, the
size of the class may vary from a few persons who purchased a defective ap-
pliance from a dishonest merchant to millions of defrauded customers of a
nationwide chain. Second, class members may be identifiable with ease or only
after the expenditure of considerable time, effort, and money. Third, the
amount of damages suffered by each member of the class may vary from a few
cents to several hundred dollars. Obviously, these components have to be
combined in such a way as to enable counsel to calculate the amount of any
foreseeable judgment, and that judgment must be substantial enough to make
litigation worthwhile; otherwise, the case will never be brought at all. Thus
it is unlikely that the courts will be confronted with many class actions in-
volving a small class of largely anonymous plaintiffs each of whom have ap-
parently suffered damages of a few dollars. Apart from the need to meet such
minimum requirements, however, class actions may be presented with an al-
most infinite variety of compositions.
A. Notice
Although rule 23(d)(2) gives a court discretionary power to order notice
to class members during the course of any class action under rule 23-whether
founded upon sections (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3)-rule 23(c)(2) sets forth a
particularized standard limited to (b)(3) actions requiring that the court
direct to class members "the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." Since most consumer class actions will have to be brought
under (b)(3) and because the cost of giving notice can be prohibitive,58 the
meaning of the quoted language becomes important.
' This assumes, of course, that the plaintiff must bear the cost, at least initially, of contacting class
members. Kaplan, supra note 29, at 398 n.1 5 7 (The Advisory Committee tacitly assumed that this burden
would ordinarily be borne by plaintiff); Advisory Committee's note, supra note 46, at 104-07. Contract
Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7, 15 (N.D. I11. 1969). The suggestion in Doglow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), that the court might conduct a preliminary hearing to
determine whether the plaintiff's case seems sufficiently meritorious, and, if so, to shift the burden of
giving notice, has been followed only under highly unusual circumstances. See Berland v. Mack, 48
F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (prior SEC proceeding against defendant indicates that plaintiff's suit is
prima facie meritorious).
[Vol. 18
THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION
The basic interpretive problem is whether "individual notice to all mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort" is intended to be a
binding definition of what shall constitute "the best notice practicable" when
the identities of class members can be easily ascertained, or, whether the indi-
vidual notice proviso is indicative or illustrative of what may be required in
appropriate cases under the general standard of "the best notice practicable."
In concrete terms, if 1,000,000 persons who purchased odd-lots during the rele-
vant period in Eisen can be identified with reasonable effort, or if the de-
fendants supply the names to the plaintiff,"7 must every one of them get in-
dividual notice of the action? Such a reading would, of course, often add
materially to the burden of bringing a class action; in some cases-perhaps
many cases-the additional burden would be enough to prevent the suit from
being brought at all. This result may be expected in virtually any case in
which the class is composed of a very large number of identified members,
unless the size of the potential payoff is so large and the likelihood of its re-
covery so great, that the representative or his lawyer is willing to invest the
necessary amount in the suit. To the extent that the drafters of the 1966 amend-
ments to rule 23 intended to improve the class action's flexibility and useful-
ness, that objective is compromised by an interpretation of the notice provisions
requiring personal notice to large numbers of people.
Rule 23(c)(2) may be intended to serve one or both of two cognate but
different goals. On the one hand, the notice requirement may be intended to
assure that no absent class member is bound by a judgment without being
afforded due process of law. Alternatively, notice may be intended to make
meaningful each class member's 23(c) (2) right to opt out of an action brought
under rule 23(b) (3).
In a class action, due process requires only that the absent class members
be sufficiently well represented to make it not unfair to bind them by any
judgment. 8 To be sure, rule 23(a) (4) requires that the court be satisfied that
a plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class in order for the action
to be maintainable at all. Since the defendant may have little or no interest in
exposing an inadequate representative, and may have an interest in not doing
so, the customary protections afforded by the adversary process do not exist.
Therefore, rule 23(c)(2) helps to ensure that an adequate representation can-
not be collaterally attacked on due process grounds by requiring that absent
class members have some supplemental protection in the form of a mechanism
permitting individual members of the class to take a hand in the litigation if
they are not satisfied with plaintiff's representation.
If rule 23(c) (2) notice is directed toward assuring the proper representa-
'This suggestion is hardly farfetched since after the Eisen decision, the defendants furnished the
plaintiff with the names of about 1,000,000 clas;s members. Note, Class Actions Under Federal Rule
23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. Riv. 139, 153 (1969).
'See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies
Provided By the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889, 905-19 (1968); Note, Class Actions Under
Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, 153 (1969).
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tion required by due process, this purpose can be served by personal notice
which presumably enables each class member to participate if he is not satisfied
with the plaintiff's representation. However, this purpose can also be served
by general notice directed to all class members in the expectation that some
will participate, by particularized notice to the largest claimants on the theory
that they have the most at stake in assuring adequate representation, or by
notice to a random sampling of class members. " If the judgment is collaterally
attacked on due process grounds, the issue is not whether each plaintiff was
notified, but rather, whether his interest were sufficiently well represented to
bind him to the judgment.6 0
On the other hand, since the decision whether to opt out of a class action
must be made by each individual member, a notice provision intended to give
absent class members the maximum opportunity to opt out would require
individual notice under circumstances when such notice was not required by
due process considerations. Anything short of personal notice to all identifiable
members would fail to satisfy this objective.
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that the most natural reading of the rule's
language-"individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort"-would mandate individual notice. In terms of the scheme
of rule 23, it also appears that rule 23(c)(2) was designed to give personal
notice ensuring the right of absent class members to opt out. Indeed, it would
make very little sense to interpret the specific language of (c) (2) as requiring
no more in (b)(3) actions than is mandated for (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions
by the requirement of due process. Moreover, the contents of the notice in-
clude the explanation of the right to opt out of the action, thus tying the notice
provision in with the right to opt out.6"
It can be argued, however, that the language in rule 23(c)(2) requiring
individual notice should be read as illustrative, not mandatory, and that the
due process interpretation of the rule should be followed. The drafters of rule
23 were principally concerned with the one-way intervention which developed
under old rule 23, and they felt that the class action device would be more use-
ful if defendants were assured that a favorable decision in the class action
would be binding on all class members. 2 Moreover, the drafters intended the
revised rules to broaden the availability of the class actions, and such a purpose
could hardly be fulfilled if the class action were encumbered with a stringent
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950); Note, Binding Eflect of
Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1064 (1954); supra note 29, at 396.
'See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 231 (1950);
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46 (1968); Kaplan,
supra note 29, at 379-80.
'See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
Second Circuit speaks of notifying a few class members with large claims and the possibility that notice
by publication may be the " 'best notice practicable,' particularly where requirement of a different form
of notice would, in effect, prevent potentially meritorious claims from being litigated" (391 F.2d at
568-70). On the other hand, the court also suggests that if many class members can be easily identified
and the plaintiff cannot afford the notice, "there may prove to be no alternative other than the dismissal
of the class suit" (ld. at 570)." Kaplan, supra note 29, at 385, 397; Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 105-06.
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requirement of personal notice. 3 In addition, experience shows that even
when plaintiffs are given the opportunity to opt out, few have the incentive to
take action. 4 It would miss the mark to assume the drafters of rule 23 would
handcuff the class action to protect a right to opt out which practically no one
will utilize.
Unfortunately, no help in construing rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) is provided
by the Advisory Committee. The Committee appears to have hovered between
three possible approaches to the notice problem: First, that individual notice
is necessary to assure the right to opt out. We have already indicated that this
rationale is inconsistent with the purpose of rule 23. Second, that (c) (2)
simply incorporates the due process standard. Third, and not heretofore men-
tioned, that due process itself requires the right to opt out. Thus, the com-
mittee may have granted the right to opt out not because they thought it
desirable, but because of constitutional necessity.
The Advisory Committee Note is also cryptic:
... [U]nder subdivision (c)(2), notice must be ordered, and is not merely dis-
cretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b)(3) class action an opportunity
to secure exclusion from the class. This mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision
(c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable
to give under subdivision (d)(2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process
to which the class action procedure is of course subject. See Hansberry v. Lee,
.... Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co....
It seems unlikely that the drafters really considered individual notice and
the right to opt out as the sine qua non of due process. In the first place, if due
process requires individual notice and the right to opt out, the (c) (2) notice
provision should be applicable to (b) (1) and (b) (2) actions as well as to
(b) (3) suits. As has been noted above, the precedent and commentary avail-
able to the Committee emphasized the adequacy of representation and the
feasibility of individual notice in the light of factual circumstances, not notice
per se. Moreover, Professor Kaplan's contemporaneous article speaks of apply-
ing the notice rules flexibly, in light: of the purpose to expand the utility of
class actions, and not rigidly as mandated by due process.65
It thus seems that to read 23(c) (2) as requiring individual notice and the
right to opt out is both inconsistent with the purpose of the rule and is not
required by due process. In view of the lack of any discernible reason to con-
strue 23(c)(2) as requiring individual notice and the right to opt out, the
language should be construed as simply incorporating the due process standard
with the "individual notice" provision being illustrative of methods which
' Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 497..98, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see Philadelphia Elec. Go. v.
Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Comment, Adequate Representation,
Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Eflectuating Remedies Provided By the Securities Laws, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 916-17 (1968).
°'Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From A
Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUsT L.J. 295, 299-300 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 29, at 397-98.
' Kaplan, supra note 29, at 395-96.
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can be used to satisfy due process. While some of the early decisions did re-
quire (c) (2) notice to all identified class members, recent authority appears
to have adopted the more flexible approach suggested here.
Even if the rule is read as not requiring personal notice, providing the best
notice practicable will often prove a major burden. At the very least, due
process requires notice which is reasonably calculated to give notice to absent
class members.6" Where a large class is involved, such minimum notice will
probably consist of a relatively prominent advertisement in one or more large
circulation newspapers.
67
However, even notice in a few large newspapers would probably not in-
form more than a small number of members of the class involved and would
still be expensive, thus acting as a substantial deterrent to bringing the action."
The cost of notice is especially significant in the proposed consumer class action
since much of the reliance for bringing such actions is being placed on poverty
agencies and legal aid offices. Such organizations, however, are not likely to
have more than token amounts available for such purposes.6" It therefore
appears that even the minimal notice required by due process may well elimi-
nate some consumer class actions.
B. Discovery and Other Pre-Trial Activities
To the extent that advocates of consumer class actions are correct in their
estimates of the impact of such actions it is true that a defendant will have
much to lose by an adverse judgment. Accordingly, a defendant will have
much incentive to engage in extensive pre-trial discovery to make certain that
nothing is overlooked that might significantly affect the outcome of the action.
In many consumer class actions, the fact that there are differences among class
members on the issues of the representation made, reliance, and damages will
mean that the defendant will probably wish to propound interrogatories to
absent class members, and perhaps depose a sampling of them. Such discovery
is the only way the defendant can learn about the plaintiff's case. Also, it is
the only way the defendant will be able to penetrate the ad dam num of the
complaint, which will often be a rough estimate by the plaintiff's attorney, to
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 31415 (1950); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968).
"7See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1968); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D.
11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Booth v. General
Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. I1. 1967).
' See Note, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. REV.
148 (1969). In Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court required a half-page ad-
vertisement on three separate dates in both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, at a total
cost of over $10,500. In Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court required plaintiff
to pay an estimated $2,500 for personal notices to certain class members and reserved decision on whether
additional notice by publication should be required. In Contract Buyer's League v. F. & F. Investment, 48
F.R.D. 7, 15 (N.D. II1. 1969), plaintiffs suing to recover for a conspiracy to charge higher-than-market
prices to Negro home purchasers were required to personally notify identified class members, and to
notify other class members by notice published in general circulation newspapers in Chicago.
"' For example, the Legal Aid and Defender Society of greater Kansas City has a total annual budget
of $4,000 to cover all miscellaneous expenses associated with pleading and discovery. Interview with
Arthur Benson, supra note 9. See also Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. Il1. 1967), afl'd,
.... U.S .... (1969), 89 S. Ct. 1622, where the court held notice by media coverage sufficient in an action
to void the one-year residency requirement for welfare.
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ascertain his possible exposure with sufficient precision to permit the planning
of a trial strategy and the evaluating of possible settlements.
In addition to the incentives for pretrial discovery presented by factual
complexity and amount at stake, there is the further incentive created by the
utility of discovery to harass the plaintiff so that he will not be interested in
further prosecuting the suit and will enter a favorable settlement. Experienced
practitioners are well aware of discovery's usefulness for such a purpose. Many
of them are capable of using such harassing tactics skillfully enough that the
plaintiff will not be able to present the court with sufficient proof to warrant
the entry of a protective order."
The effect of discovery on the consumer class action may well be more
deleterious than is commonly supposed. First, extensive discovery ordinarily
delays the date of the trial substantially.7' Despite the fact that such delay may
increase the interest payable on any award, it may still prove the best strategy
if it will cause large numbers of class members to lose interest in the litigation
and thus make a favorable settlement likely. Moreover, the defendant's ability
to take discovery from absent members does not permit them to sit on the
sidelines while their representative handles the litigation and thus undercuts
a major advantage of the class suit. Whereas this disinclination to become in-
volved works in favor of the class suit when the right of opting out is involved,
it may work to pare down the class when discovery is sought of class members.
Courts may be compelled to exclude any class member who cannot be reached
or who fails to respond to the defendant's discovery moves, as, for example,
by not answering interrogatories.72 It requires no imagination to realize that
any requirement that absent class members answer interrogatories and have
the answers notarized would be a more onerous task than many would be
willing to perform. While all questions which require individual determina-
tions could be ignored until the "common issues" are adjudicated,7 such an
approach might allow the class action to be mere "shadow boxing" for the
main event, and in any event, it would further delay an already elongated
process. In addition, it may seriously impede settlements by not giving the de-
fendant any fair notion of his exposure in the event of litigation.
In addition to communicating with class members for discovery purposes,
the court may also be compelled to notify absent class members at turning
points of the litigation and to exclude class members who fail to respond. In
this connection, rule 23(d) (2) clearly contemplates that class members will not
be ignored throughout the litigation but will be informed of its progress. Of
those class members who do respond to either a request for interrogatories or a
"'A fascinating description of such tactics may be found in Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on
Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 125-28 (1969).
See W. GLAsER, PRETRIAL DIscovRY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 101-03 (1968).
" Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577-78 (D. Minn. 1968); see Iowa v. Union Asphalt
& Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 404 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74, 75 (D. Utah
1966). Compare Kaplan, supra note 29, at 397-98 suggesting that the Advisory Committee considered
and rejected a proposal that class members be required to opt in.7 See 38 MooRE 23.45(2).
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general notice under rule 23(d) (2), a significant portion will want individual-
ized attention from plaintiff's attorney.74 Thus there is added to the expense of
each notice the expenditure in time and effort by counsel in answering indi-
vidual questions.
C. Trial
It is hard to say whether the consumer plaintiff will prefer a jury trial or a
trial before the judge. Obviously, any jury would be composed of consumers,
and many jurymen would have had unpleasant experiences as consumers, but
of course a judge is also a consumer and likewise may have had unpleasant ex-
periences."' Still, it will no doubt be true that the consumer plaintiff will want
a jury in some cases.
The class action being a creature of equity, it may be argued that there is
no right of jury trial in the consumer class action." However, the recent de-
cision of the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard,77 which upheld jury trials
in certain shareholder derivative actions, establishes that the right to jury trial
is determined by examining the nature of the underlying right being enforced.
If this right is fundamentally legal, the fact that the procedural device used is
a class action will not preclude jury trial, whereas if the right is basically
equitable, jury trial is not permitted." To the extent, then, that consumers
will consider the right to elect a jury trial as important, this dichotomy fur-
nishes additional support for the conclusion that actions for damages, not ac-
tions for injunctions, will be of greatest significance.
The trial of a consumer class action will likely be a complicated and lengthy
proceeding. Where trial is by jury, jury selection itself may present difficulties
where the defendant is large and well known. It may, for example, be difficult
to find jurors in the Chicago area, or anywhere else, who do not have some
familiarity with and consequent feelings toward a large corporation such as
Montgomery Ward. Indeed, the very factor which may incline the plaintiff
to opt for jury trial-the tendency of many jurors to identify themselves as
consumers-will increase the likelihood of substantial disqualification.
While predicting the length of trials can never be done with precision, it
can generally be said that trials involving large sums of money, and questions
which are terribly important to the parties, tend to be long and drawn out.
There is nothing on the consumer class action horizon which suggests any
difference.
C, f. 3B MOORE 23.55, at 23-1153-56 nn.19, 22-25
"Cf. City of Grafton v. Holt, 58 W. Va. 182, 52 S.E. 21 (1905).
Ci. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 285-86 (1950). Professor Chafee willingly concedes that
the more permissive joinder rules at law might well mean that a jury would be available, but argues that
the historic inability of juries to deal with all of the issues posed in representative suits argues against
their use.
"396 U.S. 531 (1970).
¢ This result was probably implicit in the Court's earlier decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500 (1958). See generally McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A
Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1967).
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D. Post Trial
If the plaintiff is successful, there must then be more communication with
class members. 9 If damages can be computed without any additional informa-
tion, such communication may be advisable simply to verify addresses and to
pay recoveries to the proper parties. Usually, however, damages will not be
fixed and it will be necessary for the consumer to take some affirmative action
to establish his damages. While commentators have been optimistic about the
ability to distribute small individual damage recoveries to large numbers of
people, few have discussed the methods available,8° and the paucity of cases
provides little guidance.
In order to distribute the recoveries, it is necessary to (1) identify individual
class members to the extent that such identification was not made when the
action was commenced; (2) prove individual claims; and (3) distribute re-
coveries. The identification of class members at the conclusion of the action,
perhaps years after the consumer fraud which generated the action, is difficult
and expensive. Moreover, the efforts to notify class members must be more
intensive than at the start of the action since class members have a direct
financial interest in the recovery. Such efforts, in the case of a large class, might
require very extensive advertising and even possible mailings to groups in
which there would be many class members. Considering the number of per-
sonnel required to answer inquiries and to handle other mechanics it can-
not be gainsaid that such efforts would be very expensive.8'
Proving individual claims may pose a greater problem. For example, in
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,82 it would have been necessary for individual taxi
riders to recall taxi fares paid between five and ten years earlier to recover any-
thing from the defendant. Some review of the allegations would have been re-
quired to prevent exorbitant claims. And, the "individual issues" problem is
exacerbated if, in addition to damages, each individual must prove justifiable
reliance, deception, absence of notice, or some similar matter.
Finally, merely distributing the funds would involve additional administra-
tive expenses in terms of verifying addresses, issuing checks, explaining cal-
culations, and the like. Coupled with deductions from the fund for attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, prior notices, and other expenses, these administrative
expenses could eat up a substantial portion of a recovery even in the millions
of dollars. Such a possibility raises the spectre of litigation designed to punish
the defendant and reward attorneys, without conferring any tangible benefit
on the injured consumers.8" It would appear that there are much simpler ways
to punish the defendant, insofar as that is a worthy objective; it is doubtful
See Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 2 CCH POVERTY LAw REP. 9652 at 10,794 (Il. Cir. Ct.
Cook Cty. (1969).
'See, e.g., Note, Damages in Class Actions: Determination and Allocation, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REV. 615 (1968).
"Consider Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
"63 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
'See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567, 571 (2d Cir. 1968).
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whether a procedure should be employed which ostensibly benefits injured
consumers, but does not in fact do so.
Moreover, it has apparently been assumed that large amounts of the re-
covery would not be claimed because of the above-mentioned difficulties. This
appears clearly possible in Daar since the ability of individuals to establish
losses is very doubtful. One solution is to allow the state to collect any un-
claimed sums, 4 but this serves only one of the functions of the class action-
deterrence; it fails to accord restitution to the individuals injured. If it is
known in advance that states together with successful attorneys are going to
garner the lion's share of any recoveries in many of the cases, and deterrence
is the primary result desired, it appears much simpler to allow states to bring
actions on their own for damages to consumers and to allow the recoveries to
be placed in the general tax revenues.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The ultimate objective of most consumer advocates is to create a set of
institutions which enable the consumer to be sovereign in the marketplace. No
goal so far-reaching is attained by the enactment of a single rule of law, the
grant of a single remedy, or the creation of a single procedural mechanism.
The preceding analysis indicates that in certain situations the consumer class
action will prove quite useful, but in other situations it is likely to be of
doubtful utility.
It is worth keeping in mind that the consumer class action does not purport
to deal with many consumer problems. It presupposes the existence of a favor-
able body of substantive law to be enforced, and where substantive legal rules
constitute the major obstacle to the vindication of the consumer, as in the case
of the holder-in-due-course doctrine applied to consumer paper 5 or the lack
of adequate warranty protection," such rules will have to be changed first.
While the class action device will overcome one factor deterring consumers
from seeking legal relief, it will not eliminate certain other obstacles in the
path of consumers: ignorance of their legal rights, distrust of the courts, or
unwillingness to become involved. 7 These matters also require direct attack
through appropriate means.
If the consumer class action is looked at solely as an instrument for securing
restitution and for deterring frauds, its utility will vary depending upon the
type of case presented. The small-group, high-damage situation, for example,
"See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715 n.15, 433 P.2d 732, 746 n.15, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724,
738 n.15 (1967); Note, Damages in Class Actions: Determination and Allocation, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 615, 622 (1968). Compare Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 62 (7th Cir. 1939) (un-
claimed damages returned to defendant).
S'Abolition or curtailment of this doctrine heads the legislative agenda of most consumerists. See
generally Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Eflective Programs lor Protection,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 414-18 (1966).
'See, e.g., FTC, STAFF REPORT ON AtrroMOBILE WARRANTIES (1968); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON APPLIANCE WARRANTIES AND SERVICE (1969).
"' These obstacles are especially prevalent among low-income consumers, notwithstanding the avail-
ability of legal aid programs. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 170-78 (1963).
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when a group of consumers is defrauded by a phony freezer plan, appears
well-suited for the class action approach. The small numbers make it relatively
easy and inexpensive to identify almost all class members. As a result, giving
any required notice to class members--whether at the inception of the action,
at a critical stage, or when damages are to be assessed-does not present great
difficulties. The relatively large size of individual claims gives class members
more incentive to participate in the investigatory and discovery phases of the
action and to testify at the trial. And, if liability should be determined, in-
dividuals with large claims should be willing to participate in proceedings
designed to fix their individual damages. A class action based on a freezer
plan fraud appears much more easily managed than the massive securities
fraud and antitrust actions that are regularly accorded class action treatment.
A second generic situation well-suited to class action treatment is presented
when the defendant has an existing relationship with the class that makes any
necessary communication and distribution of refunds relatively easy. Thus,
in Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co."8 (where plaintiffs sought to recover
life insurance premiums which Ward billed to its charge account customers),
the monthly communications between Ward and such charge account custom-
ers are important in enabling the action to proceed expeditiously. The class ac-
tion is also an especially good remedy when class members do not have to take
part in the proceedings in any way to get relief. Thus, if it is possible to cal-
culate damages by a mechanical formula applicable to all class members, and
to make the refunds by means of credits to existing accounts, then a class ac-
tion appears especially appropriate."
On the other hand, class actions appear inappropriate in some cases. The
large group with small individual damages creates management problems of
severe proportions and also raises the spectre of litigation designed to benefit
lawyers alone or to punish the defendant-a purpose more easily carried out
by means other than class actions.
In addition, the class action does not deal with the generally dishonest
merchant, who uses a large number of deceptive practices. As already noted,
there is a serious question whether such a case even qualifies for class action
treatment. But even if it does, the individual questions loom so large in the
picture that managing the class action can turn out to be impossible.
Another case not suited to class action treatment is the fly-by-night operator
who has neither the funds to pay any judgment, nor the will to stay in one
place throughout the litigative process. While a class injunctive action may
help here, such an injunction will only operate prospectively, and, because of
the lack of a foreseeable money judgment, will probably be brought only by
poverty agencies acting as private attorneys general who need the "class action"
to confer standing. Since the fly-by-night operator lacks funds to pay a judg-
ment, the only meaningful deterrents are criminal prosecution or requiring
" 2 CCH POVERTY LAW REP. 9652, at 10,794 (I11. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. 1969).
'See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939).
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such an operator to file a bond before commencing business in the jurisdiction.
However, the fly-by-night operator is probably best dealt with by the existing
governmental agencies as "beefed up" with the power to either issue, or easily
obtain, preliminary injunctions.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with consumer class actions is the fact that
they will not provide quick relief for consumers.9 In fact, the converse seems
true: the type of action envisioned is practically a guarantee that such actions
will be complicated and drawn out, and will involve substantial litigation
expenses.
Considering the above shortcomings of consumer class actions in providing
an effective remedy to individuals, its proponents, in supporting its utility,
properly point to the deterrent value of such litigation."' However, the very
factors that may enable class actions to act as deterrents-the showcase features,
the substantial threat of a large monetary judgment, and possible long-term
effects on the defendant's business methods-can only induce the defendant to
fight harder and to use all available resources. Moreover, utilizing the class
action procedure inherently means that proceedings will be more prolonged
than in an ordinary lawsuit as there are proceedings relating to the class action
in addition to proceedings addressed to the principal case against the defendant.
Translating these factors into practical litigation terms, the result will be a
plethora of motions, including pleading motions and motions directed toward
limiting or subdividing the class, a possible motion for summary judgment,
extensive discovery by the defendant coupled with strong resistence to the
plaintiff's discovery efforts, a lengthy trial and appeal, and post-appeal attempts
to minimize any award which is made. In cases where substantial issues have
been reserved because they require individual adjudication, the initial decision
against the defendant may be less than half the battle.
The Holstein case provides an illustration of some of the difficulties which
may be expected in a consumer class action. The plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint in January, 1968. During the ensuing fourteen months, the plaintiffs
made several court appearances, filed three amended complaints, and served
several briefs and memoranda covering issues raised by various motions made
by the defendant. In March, 1969, the propriety of the class action was finally
affirmed. This is not an unusual situation, indeed, cases involving class actions
for securities frauds indicate that such extensive paperwork and long delays
are the rule rather than the exception." The large class size, the many issues
'Many of the statements by proponents of the consumer class action stress the delay in administrative
proceedings. See, e.g., Tydings, supra note 6, at 37; Testimony of Bess Myerson Grant, B.N.A. ANTI-
TRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REP. No. 448, at A-5 (Feb. 10, 1970). But, as we have attempted to
point out, a well-financed and determined defendant can delay a consumer class action just as easily as an
administrative proceeding.
'1See Dole, supra note 10; Starrs, supra note 10; Tydings, supra note 6.
"'See, e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (determination of validity of class ac-
tion not made until 3 years after the complaints were filed because of a pending SEC action); Mersay v.
First Republic Corp., CCH FED. SEc. LAw REP. (1967-69 Transfer Binder) 92.304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(action settled after 5 years for between 5-10% of claim). In Contract Buyer's League v. F. & F. Invest-
ment, 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the plaintiffs, Negro homeowners, brought a class action alleging that
defendants conspired to exploit racial segregation and charge exorbitant prices to Negro purchasers of
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involved, and the substantial damages sought, make the use of these tactics
particularly effective against poverty agencies badly strapped for manpower
and funds. One commentator has related his attempts to prosecute a few
"test cases" in the consumer fraud area, and his inability to avoid such delaying
tactics." It would appear that a well-financed defendant, with a lot at stake,
can even cause more delay than has been described herein.
These tactics result in more than justice delayed. They encourage settle-
ments for small amounts, and may result in lax prosecution of suits.94 Eventu-
ally, the various dilatory tactics that defendants can employ will deter a large
number of suits from being brought at all.
homes. The complaint was filed in January, 1969, and in March, 1969, the court determined the validity
of the class action (48 F.R.D. 7). In May, 1969, the court wrote a lengthy opinion granting in part the
defendant's motions to dismiss and limiting the class to Negro homeowners who purchased their homes
within the five year limitations period (300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969)). The district court permitted
an interlocutory appeal on the limitations issue and in January, 1970, the Seventh Circuit modified the
district court's decision and included within the class all homeowners whose home-purchase contracts
terminated within the five year period, even though the purchases were made earlier (2 CCH POVERTY L.
REP. 10,800 (7th Cir. 1970)).
' Schrag, supra note 70.
O'See, e.g., Mersay v. First Republic Corp., CCH FED. SEC. LAw REP. (1967-69 Transfer Binder)
92.304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (settlement gave shareholders 5-10% of potential recovery in 5 year old action).
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